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  ABSTRACT
 Most studies of executive compensation have data on pay but not total income. Because exchange-listed 
Japanese firms (unlike exchange-listed U.S. firms) need not disclose executive compensation figures in 
their securities filings, most studies on Japan lack even good data on pay.  Through 2004, however, the 
Japanese tax office disclosed the tax liabilities of the 73,000 Japanese with the highest incomes.  We 
obtained this data, and match the high-tax list against the list of CEOs of the firms listed on Section 1 of the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange.  We thus estimate salaries and risk exposure in a new way. We confirm survey and 
anecdotal evidence that Japanese executives earn less than American--- about one-fifth the pay, adjusting 
for firm size and outside income. Tobit regressions show that pay in Japan depends heavily on firm size 
(a .22 elasticity) and on accounting profitability, but not on stock returns.  Additionally, family-owned 
firms and those with large lead shareholders pay less to employee CEOs not in the family or with large 
shareholdings, as do firms whose directors have less tenure on the board. 
*Minoru Nakazato is Professor of Law (Taxation and Law & Economics), University of Tokyo; J. Mark Ramseyer is the 
Mitsubishi Professor of Japanese Legal Studies, Harvard Law School; Eric B. Rasmusen is the Dan R. & Catherine M. 
Dalton Professor, Kelley School of Business, Indiana University.   We gladly acknowledge the generous financial 
assistance of the East Asian Legal Studies Program and the John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics & Business at the 
Harvard Law School.  We received helpful advice and suggestions from Nina Baranchuk, Jesse Fried, Takeshi Fujitani, 
Tsuyoshi Ito, Steven Kaplan, Yoshihisa Masaki, Zen'ichi Shishido, Masao Yoshimura, and workshop participants at 
UCLA, Columbia, Illinois, GRIPS, Harvard, the University of Tokyo, and the University of Washington.  Copies of the 
latest   draft   and,   eventually,   the   datasets   and   STATA   “do”   files   may   be   found   via 
http://www.rasmusen.org/papers/exec/exec.htm.    Page 2
I. Introduction
  Most studies of executive pay use the data from regulatory filings by American firms compiled in 
ExecuComp, as detailed in Cadman, Klasa, and Matsunaga (2006).  This paper differs in two ways. 
First, we look at executives in Japan, a country whose executive pay is much less studied because 
corporations need not report the pay level to government regulators.  Even reliable information on the 
average level of pay in Japan has been hard to come by, much less information that can be used to study 
its determinants.   Second, we look at executive income, not just the pay executives obtain from the 
corporation.  
 Publicly traded corporations in the United States must disclose not only financial accounting data but 
also detailed information on the pay of top executives, including how it breaks down into salary, 
options, and bonus.  Since this is a disclosure requirement for the company and not the executive, it fails 
to include anything about the executive’s income from other sources.  Regulatory filings in Japan lack 
even this data—all that need be disclosed is the compensation of the board of directors in aggregate. 
Our data consist of the income tax paid by the richest executives in Japan in 2004, plus company data 
from the securities filings of the publicly traded firms for which they work.  The tax forms themselves 
are confidential, but until recently the Japanese government disclosed the identity and total tax bill of 
anyone paying over 10 million yen in taxes -- some 578 corporate presidents in 2004.  We also have 
financial data on the companies for which they worked, and personal and company information on 813 
other presidents whose tax bills we know must be less than 10 million yen (since they do not appear on 
the government list).  We thus have a measure of an executive’s total income from all sources. 
The best-known comparison between American and Japanese executives is Kaplan (1994), which is 
limited to the largest 121 companies in Japan and takes as its data for CEO pay the mean amount  paid 
to the on-average 22 members of the board of directors (the only compensation number that Japanese    Page 3
corporations must report).  John (1999) also looks at average board compensation, but for 796 firms 
from 1968 to 1992.  Japanese boards have fewer outside members than American boards, but given the 
size of the boards and the fact that many members work only part time, the aggregate compensation 
measure is a rough guide to the pay of the CEO.  Furthermore, as Kato (1997) tells us, even this 
reporting requirement can exempt substantial cash compensation to executives. Other studies of 
Japanese executive pay, such as Abowd & Bognanno (1995), Xu (1997) and Kato & Kubo (2006), use 
data from surveys by management consulting firms.  Although this data can be very rich (Kato & Kubo 
tracks 51 firms for 10 years), the selection of companies is nonrandom and samples are small.  
Two studies, Kato & Rockel (1992) (on executive pay) and Kato (1997) (on the effect of belonging to 
a “keiretsu”), use the same tax-reporting data source that we do, but use the tax paid by 599 managers in 
1985 instead of our 2004 data.   A third study, Basu, Hwang, Mitsudome & Weintrop (2007) (on 
executive pay) uses four years of tax data on 174 firms from 1992 to 1996.   Those studies use smaller 
samples and older data, and do not adjust for the presence of entrepreneurial executives with sizeable 
capital income.  Moreover, they ignore the truncation and selection problems caused by the tax data’s 
minimum tax requirement (that an observation with a large negative disturbance will drop out of the tax 
dataset).  By contrast, we adjust for these problems and simultaneously incorporate information about 
executives earning less than the tax reporting threshold by using tobit instead of ordinary least squares.  
  To preview our findings: Japanese executive incomes are about one third of U.S. executive 
compensation. Adjusting for the fact that our income figure includes capital income and for firm size, 
we estimate that Japanese executive compensation is closer to one fifth that in the United States.   This 
finding is important in itself, because previous estimates have been anecdotal or based on limited 
surveys.  We also find that as in studies of U.S. executives, the most important determinant of pay is the 
size of the company.  CEO income rises at 21% the rate of asset size, compared to rates around 30%    Page 4
others have found for the U.S.   and do not depend on average asset size of companies in the same 
industry.  Pay also depends on accounting profitability, but not on stock price changes  or profitability 
relative to the industry mean. Family companies, those with concentrated ownership and those with 
older directors pay less, while those with directors who have been on the board longer pay more. 
II.  The Data
Since we view the organization of a new dataset for executive pay as a major contribution of this 
paper, we begin by describing the data in some detail. Impatient readers who are willing to take the 
quality of the data on faith can skip to Section III. 
A.  The Executive Tax Data
Government filing requirements give the researcher plentiful data about the characteristics of large 
public firms in both Japan and the United States.  Unlike American companies, however, Japanese 
companies need not disclose how much they pay their executives.  Instead, the law requires only that 
they disclose the total amounts they pay all members of the board of directors together.  The kind of 
government data used for studies of U.S. executive pay is unavailable for Japan.  
Instead, we turn to data based on individual tax returns. These data are not provided by the 
employers, but by the executives to the tax office, which through 2004 (but not afterwards) published 
the names, addresses, and tax liabilities of taxpayers who reported high enough incomes.
1   The tax 
threshold that triggered public disclosure varied over the years, but in 2004 it was 10 million yen (about 
$97,000 in taxes at the end-of-2004 exchange rate of 102 yen/$).  Japanese taxpayers pay a tax of 37 
percent on ordinary income beyond 18 million yen.
2  For a crude approximation of income, you may 
1 For a brief period some 80 years ago, the United States also required tax bills to be published.  See Kornhauser (2005).
2 Shotoku zei ho [Income Tax Act], Law No. 33 of 1965, Sec. 89, as amended by Shotokuzeito futan keigen sochi ho [Act 
for Measures to Reduce the Burden of the Income and Other Taxes], Law No. 8 of 1999, as amended by Law No. 21 of 2005.    Page 5
simply divide the tax liability by .37.  To illustrate a more precise approach, in Table I we use standard 
deductions and credits to calculate actual income that would generate 10 million yen in taxes.  By this 
approach, to owe the median tax bill of 10.5 million yen for executives from the top 100 firms (see 
Table III), a CEO would need to make 41 million yen ($401 thousand).  By the crude approach, he 
would need 28 million yen ($276 thousand).
Insert Table I here   
In 2004, some 73,000 Japanese paid 10 million yen or more in taxes, a small number of very rich 
people compared with the United States. Japan has about half the population of the United States and 
roughly the same median household income.  Yet in 2003, U.S. taxpayers filed 536,000 returns with 
adjusted gross incomes over $500,000, and nearly 181,000 returns with incomes over $1,000,000 (http://
www.irs.gov).  According to Piketty & Saez (2006), the contrast is largely a function of the increasing 
dispersion of income in the U.S. since the mid-1980s.
Although the tax bills of the wealthy in Japan were public information, the government did not 
provide the data in convenient form.  We therefore obtained our tax data from the Japanese affiliate of 
the D&B credit-rating service, Tokyo shoko risaachi (TSR, 2005), which uses the data for credit reports. 
In some cases, TSR added the professional affiliation of the taxpayers, in which case we generally 
followed its identification.
Starting in 2006, tax liabilities have become confidential.   Under the newly passed Personal 
Information Protection Act, the government may not release a variety of private data, including tax 
liabilities.
3  Our 2004 dataset thus represents the last available installment for academic studies.
3 Kojin joho no hogo ni kansuru horitsu [Act Relating to the Protection of Personal Information], Law No. 57 of 2003.   Page 6
Because many executives even of very large companies pay less than 10 million yen in taxes, we do 
not have tax data on all executives.  Our dataset is censored at the lower levels. Others using this data to 
estimate Japanese executive compensation (Kato & Rockel, 1992; Kato, 1997) have limited their studies 
to those executives who pay more than 10 million yen in taxes.  This has three problems.  First, the 
results do not necessarily apply to large companies which pay their executives lower salaries -- there is 
selection for companies with a policy of paying high salaries.  Second, ordinary least squares and other 
linear estimators are biased because observations with negative disturbances are more likely to result in 
incomes below the threshold and drop out of the dataset.  A technique should be used that takes into 
account this censoring.  Third, not all available information is used if the study is limited to executives 
paying over the threshold.  Although we do not know the exact incomes of the executives not in the tax 
dataset, we do know something about those incomes:  they resulted in less than 10 million yen in tax. 
This is relevant information, and we have just as good information on characteristics such as age and 
company size for low-tax executives as for high-tax ones.  Thus, we use the full dataset---selecting on 
the exogenous variable of stock exchange listing category-- and employ tobit, the standard technique for 
censored data.  
B. Corporate Financial and Governance Data
The executives in our sample are the highest-paid employees of firms listed on Section 1 of the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange.  In general, these firms are the very largest publicly traded firms in Japan. 
Because banks differ from other firms in a variety of ways -- particularly in how their accounting figures 
are to be interpreted--- we exclude them.  This leaves us with a database of 1,568 executives and firms, 
summary statistics for which are shown in Table II.     Page 7
We obtained most of our financial data on the firms from Nihon keizai shimbunsha (2005) and Toyo 
keizai shimpo sha (2005b).  We incorporated stock price data from Toyo keizai shimpo sha (2005a), and 
obtained the identity of the executives and the composition of the boards in 2004 from Toyo keizai 
shimpo sha (2005d), which took the information from securities filings.  Because firms generally list 
board members in order of importance, we collected information on the first two members listed, often 
but not always the president (shacho) and chairman of the board (kaicho). 
                                         Insert Table II here
C. Economic Income versus Taxable Income
1. The relationship.  Most executives will report taxable incomes that understate their true economic 
incomes.  Like their counterparts elsewhere, Japanese executives receive a wide array of untaxed perks 
from their employers (as estimated in Abowd & Bognanno, 1995).   We know of no reason why the ratio 
of perks  to money income would vary  with the other  variables in our study, but to the extent that firms 
that pay more in money offer fewer perks, our data will be noisier and it will be harder to find 
relationships between pay and other variables. 
To the extent that executives have income from other sources, their taxable income will exceed their 
labor compensation.  Being rich, many of these men will earn substantial investment income, and we do 
expect investment income to vary across the type of firms employing an executive.   
2.  Dividend income.   For executives who are major shareholders at their firms, the tax data will 
include the dividends they earn from their firm, but for those who are not, the data will exclude those 
dividends.  Through March 31, 2004, dividends (typically paid in June and December) were subject to a    Page 8
national withholding tax of 15 percent and a uniform local tax (collected by the national government) of 
5 percent.  After April 1, they were subject to a national withholding tax of 7 percent and local tax of 3 
percent.  Because the withholding satisfied an investor’s liability with respect to that income, he was not 
required to include it on his return.  Should he choose not to include it, the tax he paid on the dividends 
did not appear in our data.
In two contexts, tax law denied investors this option to exclude dividend income.  First, they could 
not exclude dividends from firms unlisted on a stock exchange.   Second, they could not exclude 
dividends paid by firms in which they held at least a 5 percent interest.  Of the 1,431 presidents in our 
database, 174 held more than 5 percent of the stock in their firms.  
Shareholders who held less than 5 percent of their firm’s shares thus faced a choice:  (a) they could 
pay the 7 percent national tax and exclude the dividend income from their returns; or (b) they could pay 
the 7 percent tax, include the dividend income on their returns, and take a credit against their aggregate 
tax liability.  Because the dividend income would then be subject to the much higher marginal rates 
these executives faced on their other income, despite a dividends-received tax credit, they would 
generally have found it advantageous to pay the withholding tax and exclude the dividend income.
4  
3.  Capital Gains.  Nineteen percent of taxpayers reporting more than 30 million yen in income in 
2004 reported some capital gains income (on securities, property, or some other asset).
5  On unrealized 
capital gains, they paid no tax.  On their gains from the sale or exchange of securities, they did pay a tax 
in 2004 at a national income tax rate of 7 percent and a local tax rate of 3 percent, the same rates as for 
4 In 2004, the national government withheld taxes on 7.6 trillion yen in dividend income paid to individual taxpayers; 
those taxpayers included only 406 billion in dividend income on their returns.  Compare National Tax Office statistics at 
http://www.nta.go.jp/category/toukei/tokei/menu/gensen/h16/data/02.pdf  (amounts   withheld)   with 
http://www.nta.go.jp/category/toukei/tokei/menu/shinkoku/h16/data/01.pdf (amounts reported on returns) (last visited March 
29, 2006).
5 National Tax Office statistics, http://www.nta.go.jp/category/toukei/tokei/menu/shinkoku/h16/data/01.pdf (last visited 
on March 29, 2006).     Page 9
dividends.  In this context, the law did not distinguish between long-term and short-term gains.  As with 
dividends, investors could elect whether (i) to satisfy the tax through withholding and exclude the gains 
from their returns, or (ii) to include the gains in their returns.  
A rich taxpayer had no clearly best strategy for dealing with capital gains, unlike the optimal 
dividend strategy we just described.  As the stock market began to recover in 2004, some investors 
would have found themselves with substantial capital appreciation.  Whether our dataset captures any 
gains they chose to recognize by selling the stock, we cannot say.  Regardless of whether an investor 
elected to include capital gains on his return instead of using withholding, he faced the same 7 percent 
tax rate.  In either case he had the same right to carry forward any losses for three years.  And in either 
case he had the same ability to time his gains and losses by choosing when to sell which securities.  
Gains from the sale or exchange of real estate were taxed at separate rates, but not through 
withholding.  Instead, investors had to include the gains on their returns.  They paid a 15 percent tax if 
they held the property more than 5 years, and 30 percent if held it for 5 or less years.  
4.  Stock options.  Stock options are far less important in Japan than in the United States, but since the 
late 1990s, Japanese firms have been able to offer their senior executives tax-favored stock option plans. 
Provided a plan "qualifies" under the tax code, an executive obtains a variety of tax benefits:  he pays no 
tax when he receives the option; pays no tax when he exercises the option; and pays tax only at the very 
low capital gains rates when he eventually sells the stock he bought upon exercise.
6    
Suppose executive Z obtains qualified options to buy 10 shares at 10x yen (10,000 yen) each in year 
1.  With the shares trading at 14x yen in year 4, he exercises the options and buys the 10 shares for 100x 
yen.  In year 5 he sells the stock for 220x yen.  He would pay no tax in years 1 and 4, but he would pay 
tax on his capital gain of 220x yen - 100x yen = 120x yen in year 5.  By contrast, suppose he obtained 
6 See generally Kato, Lemmon, Luo & Schallheim (2005); Sozei tokubetsu sochi ho [Special Tax Measures Act], Law no. 
26 of 1957, Sec. 29-2.   Page 10
unqualified options.  He still would incur no tax liability in year 1.  In year 4, however, he would have 
taxable compensation income of (14x yen - 10x yen)10  =  40x yen, and he would have capital gains of 
220x yen - 140x yen  =  80x yen in year 5.  
To qualify for advantageous tax treatment, an option program must stay within several limits.  The 
rules have changed over time, but in 2004 a program qualified only to the extent that an executive:  (a) 
used options to buy less than 12 million yen's worth of stock ($117,000) in a year; (b) could not exercise 
the options less than 2 or more than 10 years after receiving them; (c) could not transfer the options; and 
(d) received out-of-the-money options, with an exercise price at least as high as the stock price at the 
time of receipt.  
We take our information on the option programs outstanding from Daiwa shoken SMBC (2005). 
29.1% of our firms have option programs (see Table II).  For each firm, we know when the shareholders 
voted to authorize an option program.  We do not know whether the program qualified under the tax 
code, or how many options each executive received (to the best of our knowledge, this information is 
simply unavailable).
We doubt that Japanese executives earn much option income not captured in our data.  After all, if a 
firm gave its CEO unqualified options, he recognized taxable income (captured by our dataset) in the 
year of exercise.  He avoided that recognition (and inclusion in the dataset) only if the firm gave him 
qualified options.  Of course, this does not mean the executives in our dataset necessarily avoided option 
income.   Those with deep-in-the-money options could have realized substantial untaxed (because 
unrealized) gains even on unqualified options.  Recall, though, that the Japanese stock market as a whole 
has been volatile enough to make option value (and stock value) a very noisy signal of performance. 
From   January   2000   to   January   2005,   the   Nikkei   225   fell   from   18,937   to   11,458   (see    Page 11
http://www.econstats.com/eqty/eqem_mi_4.htm), which helps explain why corporations use options less 
in Japan than in America. 
Most executives probably earned only modest amounts of income through qualified options.  First, 
the exercise price on the options had to be at least as high as the price of the stock at the time the 
executive received the option.  Kato, Lemmon, Luo & Schallheim (2005: 443) peg the median exercise 
price of Japanese options at about 5 percent above market prices.  Second, the executive could use the 
options to buy only 12 million yen's worth of stock (i.e., no more stock than he could obtain through an 
aggregate exercise price of 12 million yen).  As a result, if the firm used a qualified plan our data missed 
only the gain an executive earned from an option to buy $117,000 in stock.  Kato, Lemmon, Luo & 
Schallheim (2005: 444) estimate the median value of the options upon grant at $43,000 per board 
member.
If Japanese firms focus on tax-qualified option programs, they (like U.S. firms) seem to treat the 
options and cash compensation as complements rather than substitutes:  they more often offer options to 
high-income executives than to low.  Among the 593 firms with a president paying at least 10 million 
yen in taxes, 35 percent had adopted an option program by 2004.  Among the 286 firms with a president 
paying at least 20 million 45 percent had, but among the 837 firms with a president paying less than 10 
million only 25 percent had.  Put another way, among the 416 firms with option programs, half had 
presidents who paid at least 10 million in taxes; but among the rest, only 38 percent did.
5.  Other tax questions.   Parenthetically, note the following:  in Japan, couples may not file joint 
returns; taxpayers with rising incomes may not “average” their income across years; and pension 
payments are taxed at lower rates than salaries.   Page 12
Understandably, wealthy Japanese resented the publication of their tax liability.  To skirt disclosure, 
they could legally do one of two things.  First, they could pay a penalty and submit their returns late. 
The tax office included on its list only those high-income taxpayers who filed within 2 weeks of the 
March 15 tax-return deadline.  By filing after April 1, they could avoid publication.  Second, they could 
file an initial return that included only income below the amount that triggered disclosure, and then add 
an amended return that included the remaining income.  Because the tax office compiled its list only 
from the initial returns, this would avoid publication.  We do not know how many taxpayers used either 
strategy.
7  
  As at least a weak check on the reliability of our data, we compared an executive’s 2004 tax liability 
with the average land price of the neighborhood in which he lived (obtained from Toyo keizai shimpo 
sha, 2005c).  To maintain comparability, we limited our sample to executives living in the greater Tokyo 
area.  If reported incomes were completely unreliable as an indication of true income, we would expect 
to find no correlation between reported incomes and consumption. In fact, the correlation coefficient 
between an executive’s 2004 tax liability and his neighborhood’s land values  is 0.11 -- statistically 
significant at better than the 1 percent level--- so executives reporting higher incomes do live in more 
expensive neighborhoods.    
III.  How High Is Executive Income in Japan?
A.  Levels of Income
   In 2004, the highest paid CEO in the Forbes 500, Terry Semel of Yahoo, earned total compensation of 
$230.5 million, of which salary plus bonus was only $0.6 million and the rest was almost entirely capital 
7 We have at least two cross-checks on the prevalence of avoidance strategies.  First, in a study of Japanese attorney 
incomes, we have learned that one large law firm paid its equity partners by a strict age-graded pay scale.  All of those equity 
partners did indeed appear on the TSR list, and in almost every case their tax liability matched their seniority.  See Nakazato, 
Ramseyer & Rasmusen (2007).  Second, we have independent data on the salaries paid to Japanese baseball players.  64 
percent of the 173 players with salaries over 40 million yen appear on the high-income taxpayer list, 76 percent of the 123 
players with salaries over 60 million, and 90 percent of the 84 players with salaries over 80 million yen.   Page 13
gains.  The 50
th ranked earned $23.8 million, including $2.5 million in salary plus bonus, and the 250th 
earned $4.7 million, also with $2.5 million in salary plus bonus.
8
The highest paid corporate executive in Japan, Tadashi Yanai of Fast Retailing (holder of the Uniqlo 
clothing brand), paid taxes of $10.6 million in 2004, implying the taxable income of $30 million shown 
in Table III.  In America, 39 CEOs had compensation over $30 million.  Reflecting the flatter income 
distribution in Japan, only two Japanese taxpayers in any walk of life earned more than Mr. Yanai. 
From the high end, incomes fall rapidly.  The 5th highest paid executive in Japan earned only half 
Yanai’s income, the 10
th highest earned a third, and the 20
th highest barely a fifth.  Only 20 executives, 
and only 224 Japanese taxpayers in  any  endeavor earned over $6 million, whereas the pay of 211 
corporate CEOs’ in America exceeded that amount.
9  
Insert Table III here
 
As Table III shows, in the largest 100 non-bank firms in Japan the median highest paid officer earned 
$610,000; in the largest 500 firms, he earned $542,000; and in all firms he earned $401,000 (because 
these amounts include investment income, in Table IV below we estimate a lower bound for the 
compensation component).
10   
8  “CEO   Compensation,”  Forbes  online   edited   by   Scott   DeCarlo,   April   21,   2005, 
http://www.forbes.com/2005/04/20/05ceoland.html.
9 Keep in mind that being a CEO is not the only highly paid job in the business world.  In Japan, as in the United States, 
other positions in finance-related industries can be even more lucrative.   The top taxpayer on the TSR list is Tatsuro 
Kiyohara, of Tower Investment, whose tax of 36.9 million yen was three times the tax of the highest-paid CEO 
10 Several readers of earlier drafts asked how anyone could live in Tokyo on these salaries.  The cost of living is indeed 
high in Tokyo, but it is high in New York too.  According to one study (www.finfacts.com/costofliving.html, accessed Apr. 
25, 2007), in 2006 the cost of living in Tokyo was just 19.1% higher than in New York.   The western stereotype of 
stratospheric Tokyo prices are driven by the prices in the ex-patriate ghettos.   In fact, even university professors live 
comfortably in Tokyo.   Page 14
Figure 1 shows the distribution of taxes paid between 10 million and 50 million yen, which includes 
504 of the 593 presidents with taxes over 10 million.  The distribution is declining and convex with a 
long right tail, the power law distribution so typical of achievement. 
  Insert Figure 1 here
Comparing the median American and Japanese CEO figures for the top 500 firms, it seems that the 
Americans earn 8.7 times as much as the Japanese (= 4.7/.542).  This is misleading, however, for two 
reasons.
First, within any country big companies pay more than small ones.  American corporations are larger 
than Japanese firms, so picking the top 500 in each country skews the comparison.  The 75th Japanese 
size percentile in our data had assets of 242 billion yen ($2.3 billion).  Within the 192 to 292 billion yen 
range ($1.87 to 2.85 billion) our dataset contains 104 Japanese firms.  Because 49 percent of their 
presidents were on the high-tax list, they had a median income of about 40 million yen ($400,000). 
Within the same size range of $1.87 to 2.85 billion, the COMPUSTAT database contains 151 U.S. firms. 
Their CEOs had a median total current compensation of just $1.5 million, not the $4.7 million of the 
Forbes 500.  Thus, adjusting for size we would conclude that American executives earned 3.75 times as 
much as Japanese (=1.5/.4).
Second, our Japanese data is for income, but our U.S. data is for total compensation, as we will next 
discuss. 
 
B.  Labor versus Investment Income: Capitalists and Company Men    Page 15
   Executives have both labor and capital income.  Studies of American executives can identify only 
labor income; our study of Japanese executives can identify only total income. This confuses 
comparison of  the American and Japanese data. 
  We therefore divide our executives into Capitalists and Company Men.  The former both own and 
manage firms.  They thus earn substantial capital income only weakly related to their compensation as 
executives.  The latter earn less capital income and, as a result, have total income more closely 
correlated to their labor income.  We define a Capitalist as one of the 402 corporate presidents who 
either is one of the top ten shareholders of the firm (of which there are 273), or who serves at his family 
firm as defined in the Appendix (there are 229 such executives, with 110 of those also being  top-ten 
shareholders). (We explore alternative definitions of Capitalist in Section V.b, below.)  The minimum 
value of the shareholding of executives in the top ten is  813,440 thousand yen, equal to about 7.98 
million dollars at the exchange rate of 102 yen/dollar. We lack information on shareholdings below the 
top ten.    
Capitalists thus defined do indeed report higher incomes than Company Men.  As illustrated in Table 
IV, the median Capitalist paid 57 million yen in taxes.  Only 37 percent paid less than 10 million, while 
over 12 percent paid more than 70 million.  By contrast, the median Company Man paid less than 10 
million yen, and less than 1 percent (6 executives) paid more than 70 million. 
 .  According to the aggregate data in Table III, the median president of the 100 largest firms paid 
taxes of 15.3 million yen--- suggesting a median income of about 534 thousand dollars.  Table IV gives 
us the comparable figure for those presidents least likely to have outside income.  The median Company 
Man president at the top 100 firms paid taxes of 14 million.  Apparently, outside investment income 
may have caused the Table III estimates to exceed actual executive compensation by as much as 7 
percent.  Among the largest 500 firms, the median president paid taxes of 11 million (Table III).  The    Page 16
estimate using Company Men (Table IV) indicates that the median president may have paid taxes on 
compensation income of about 10 million. 
Insert Table IV here
Adjusting for both capital income and size of company, we estimate that American executives earn 
not 8.7 times as much as Japanese (the multiple ignoring company size) or 3.75 (the multiple adjusting 
for size but not capital income), but 5.2 times as much---  a typical CEO's compensation would be 5.2 
times as high if his company were American rather than Japanese.  Thus, we conclude:
Finding 1:  Japanese executives earn 19.2% as much as American executives,adjusting for firm size.
 
Studies often compare the ratio of executive salaries to those of ordinary workers.  Kaplan (1994, p. 
536) reports a ratio of 13.5 for the pay of US executives in 1983; Kato & Long (2006, p. 959) report 
ratios of 7 for China around 1998-2002, 4.2 for Japan in 1995-96,  and 5.6 for Korea in 1998–2001. 
We estimate a ratio of 6.6 for Japan in 2004 for the income of the average Company Man to the average 
worker.
11 
IV. What Determines Executive Income?   
 A.   Three Theories
11  We used the 2004 average wage in manufacturing from the International Labor Organization, http://laborsta.ilo.org/. 
We estimate the ratio for an executive of the average-sized firm in our sample. Since such a firm’s executive would pay on 
average less than the 10 million yen minimum tax for reporting, we use the predicted value of his wage from regression 
equation V-1 below, dividing the tax bill by .37 as explained above.    Page 17
      Having estimated the amount that Japanese executives are paid, the next question is why some are 
paid more than others.  Theories of executive pay can be divided into three groups: market theories, 
incentive theories, and capture theories. 
(1) Market theories focus on supply and demand, and explain pay patterns by how much a firm 
benefits from talented management and how much it needs to pay managers to take a difficult but 
prestigious job.  High pay would be observed at a company with a special need for talent (e.g., the 
information-processing need studied in Henderson & Fredrickson [1996]) or a company whose CEO 
position was unattractive because of such factors as its location or scandal-ridden history.  Low pay 
would be observed at a company where talent had a lower marginal product or where the CEO was 
willing to accept a lower salary because of a personal attraction to the company.  Stewardship theories of 
management   (e.g.,   Davis,   Schoorman   &   Donaldson   [1997];   Deckop,   Mangel   &   Cirka   [1999], 
Wasserman [2006]) are market theories to the extent that they describe situations where non-monetary 
incentives control manager behavior.  Under these theories, actual compensation remains a function of 
what a company is willing to pay and what a manager is willing to accept.  Under any market theory of 
compensation, pay-for-performance would have little effect on performance.  Instead, incentive pay 
schemes more likely reflect factors like tax avoidance strategies. 
If we were able to observe talent, a market theory would predict a clear correlation with pay. 
Consistent with this logic, Tosi, Misangyi, Fanelli, Waldman & Yammarino (1996) find that charisma—
a form of talent—is related to pay and firm performance. Because most facets of talent are not 
observable directly, however, scholarly attention has focussed on firm size instead.  Gabaix & Landier 
(2008) construct a matching model of the supply and demand for top executives and suggest (with 
supporting data) that a firm’s market value and the market value of other firms in its industry explain the 
bulk of executive compensation. Holmstrom (2005) provides valuable informal comments on the    Page 18
importance of market value and benchmarking that support the Gabaix-Landier theory.   It is also 
supported by the meta-analysis of Tosi, Werner, Katz & Gomez-Mejia (2000), who find that 40% of the 
variance in CEO pay in the United States can be explained by company size, compared to only 5% by 
performance.  Kaplan & Rauh (2006) conclude that the recent rise in the incomes of the highest earning 
Americans—with special attention to executives--- represents returns to superstars and the impact of 
increases in firm size that make their talent more productive, (although they also cite technological 
change).  Because we have only one year of data, we focus on firm size.  
(2) Incentive theories proceed from agency theory to focus on the way firms structure compensation 
contracts to induce their managers to work hard and make appropriate decisions.  These theories predict 
that managerial pay will increase with company performance.  Because bigger agency problems require 
higher-powered incentives, they also predict that managerial pay will correlate with the risks that 
executives personally bear.  Since Jensen & Meckling (1976) and Fama & Jensen (1983) there has been 
a tremendous outpouring of work, both theoretical and empirical, on the incentive effects of executive 
contracts, looking both at how executive pay and wealth vary with performance and how performance 
varies with executive incentives.  Jensen & Murphy’s (1990) much-cited study showed that a dollar 
value of increase in a company’s value seemed to have too tiny an effect on executive wealth to be 
important.  Since 1990, however,  companies in the United States increasingly use stock options, and 
Conyon, Core & Guay (2006) find that the exceptional American use of incentive pay (with its need for 
a higher expected value of pay  to compensate for risk) can explain why executive pay is lower in the 
United Kingdom. 
 In recent work scholars have focussed on the way firms vary in how they relate pay to performance. 
In effect, they make the compensation structure endogenous.  Coles, Lemmon & Meschke (2007) and 
Edmans, Gabaix & Landier (2007) build structural models with a multiplicative production function in    Page 19
which effort and firm size are complements.   Coles, Lemmon & Meschke use this and CEO risk 
aversion to explain why Tobin’s Q (which measures a firm’s opportunities as well as a manager’s ability 
to create value from investment) is higher with moderate levels of the CEO’s ownership of the firm than 
for low or high levels.  Edmans, Gabaix & Landier combine the multiplicative form with the talent-
matching model of Gabaix & Landier (2008) to show that the dollar/dollar sensitivity of pay to 
performance found to be so small by Jensen & Murphy (1990) should indeed decline with firm size, but 
that the dollar/percentage-change sensitivity (scaled by the level of pay) would be invariant to firm size 
and would deter a plausible amount of shirking.  
These recent studies yield two lessons potentially relevant to our analysis of Japan.   First, the 
sensitivity of pay to performance is endogenous.  As a result,  different structural models will imply 
different interaction terms for sensitivity with other variables.   Second, where pay varies with 
performance, it may turn on rates rather than levels:  pay may be sensitive to changes in percentage 
changes in profit rather than to dollar changes. 
That pay is based on incentives compensation contracts may not be the most cost-effective way to 
motivate Japanese executives.  Hypothetically, for example, contrary to the incentive theory perhaps 
non-material incentives are overwhelmingly important for agents at the income level of CEO’s.  Or 
perhaps boards can constrain agency slack more effectively by monitoring executives directly.  CEOs 
are highly visible, after all, and may care deeply about their reputation with their peers and with the 
world at large.  A particular example of this is the ability of the CEO to join the board of his own or 
another company, as has been studied in the Japanese context by Brickley, Coles & Linck (2000) and 
Rebick (1995).  And perhaps incentive pay is simply too hard to implement rigorously and safely.  Even 
if it could prove valuable in theory,  top executives can too readily manipulate accounting numbers and 
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(3) Capture theories focus on the relative balance of power between shareholders and executives. 
The most prominent modern example is Bebchuk & Fried (2004).  If a firm's shareholders are few and 
can readily organize, for instance, it will pay its executives less than a firm “captured” by those 
executives.  At the captured firm, the executives may stack the board with more generous directors, or 
appoint people more inclined to please them (the executives).   Variations in pay, by these capture 
theories, will correlate more closely with the strength of a firm's corporate governance than with its need 
for talent or its need to incentivize its managers.  
Scholars suggest a variety of ways to measure the strength of a firm's corporate governance. One set 
of variables relates to the board of directors -- its size, the proportion of inside directors, and the length 
of their tenure, all of which would be associated with weaker control.  A second set relates to the 
concentration of ownership -- the number of large shareholders, whether they are corporate, family, or 
individual, and how much of the stock is held by executives.  Bebchuk & Fried (2004) discuss these in 
depth, and Boyd (1994) and Coombes & Gilley (2005) find evidence that in the U.S. stronger board 
control is associated with lower executive salaries.  
Governance clearly interacts with productivity. Coombes & Gilley (2005) find that stakeholder 
management is associated with less incentive pay, and Hartzell & Starks (2003) find that ownership by 
institutional investors is correlated with increased sensitivity of CEO pay to company performance.  On 
the other hand, Brickley, Coles & Jarrell (1997) point to the value-increasing benefits of combining the 
positions of CEO and chairman of the board of directors and present empirical evidence suggesting that 
doing so does not result in lower performance by the firm.  They note that firms which make the unusual 
choice to separate the positions do so for special reasons such as smoothing succession between one 
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As with incentive pay contracts, governance structures are endogenous (Hermalin & Weisbach 
[1998], Himmelberg, Hubbard & Palia [1999]).  Firms with apparently poor governance features may 
have chosen them for profit-maximizing reasons.  Coles, Lemmon & Wang (2008) follow up on Coles, 
Lemmon & Meschke (2007) by adding to their model the choice of the proportion of outsiders on the 
board of directors.   For a firm to employ outside directors has its downside, because outsiders are less 
well informed about the firm than insiders and so may make worse decisions.  A profit-maximizing firm 
trades this off against the monitoring advantage of outside directors, which permits less risk to be 
imposed on managers by substituting for the effort incentive in the pay-performance link.  Endogeneity 
is a serious problem for tests of the capture theory, because a firm which hires a more productive 
manager may have less need to oversee his performance and hence use a weaker corporate governance 
structure. 
   All three theories predict lower pay in Japan,  market theory pointing to internal hiring which 
restricts competition across companies for CEO-level talent, incentive theory pointing to closer direct 
control by large shareholders which makes incentive pay less necessary, and capture theory pointing to 
that same direct control but as reducing CEO power to set salaries.  Thus, our finding that executive pay 
is lower in Japan does not reject any of the theories. 
B.  A Combined Theoretical Framework
The market, incentive, and capture theories of executive pay each have their own implications, but 
they can be combined, as we will do in the model below.  We will then explore which parts of the 
combined theory show up as significant in regression analysis. 
 Let us suppose that executive compensation is determined in a marketplace, but one complicated by 
incentives and capture.  Let us use subscript i to mark executive-level variables, j to mark firm-level    Page 22
variables, and ij to mark variables resulting from a combination of executive i and firm j.  On the supply 
side, executive  i  has talent  ti, and a risk-averse utility function increasing in the wage,  wi  , but 
decreasing in effort, ei: 
(1)                                                          ui = f(wi) – ei,
where f is a strictly concave increasing function.  Executives choose firms based on the contracts the 
firms offer, and they have a reservation utility increasing in their talent:  u(ti), so that u’(ti)>0.
Assume that pij , the profit gross of executive pay, is a function of the base profitability of the firm bj 
plus the marginal product of the executive, which in turn depends on his talent, his effort, the size of the 
firm  x, various control variables such as age that we will represent   by  ci,  where only the base 
profitability,  talent, and the size of the firm are observable by  boards of directors:  
(2)                                                           pij =    bj +  ti*ei*xj*ci  
As in Gabaix & Landier (2008) we use a multiplicative specification in which talent and size are 
complements, something which will be important in the empirical estimation.  
If a board of directors wants its executive to choose other than minimal effort, it will have to use an 
incentive contract, based on observable variables.  The exact form of the contract would depend on the 
exact form of the distribution of noise and on the executive’s utility function, but we know that the 
realized value of wij  will be a function of observed profit. 
   Let there be many potential executives of each talent level relative to the number of firms.  In that 
case, executives will be willing to work for as low as their reservation level of utility.  Combined with 
the need to induce high effort by imposing risk on the executive, this will determine the expected value 
of the market wage, wm(ti).    Page 23
The objective, vj, of the board of directors at firm j is a combination of profit and a desire to overpay 
the executive, the balance of these two depending on governance slack, sj---an index of features of the 
firm such as the percentage of inside directors.  Letting zj denote the overpayment at firm j (so wij = 
wm(ti)+ zj), we will specify the objective function as
(3)                                 vj =  [pij –wij] +   sj*h (zj)
                                          =   bj +  ti*ei*xj*ci  – wm(ti) - zj  + sj*h(zj), 
where  h  is an increasing function of  z  and the second line substitutes for the profit function from 
equation (2). 
 The board of directors chooses the levels of talent ti and overpayment zj to maximize vj.  If sj=0 then 
the firm maximizes profit.  Since the marginal utility of zj is increasing in governance slack, sj, more 
slack will lead to higher zj and a higher wage relative to the market wage.  Since size and talent are 
complements, and the market wage rises with talent, the board of a bigger firm will choose a higher 
level of talent.  Since higher levels of talent cost more because of higher market wages, bigger firms will 
be seen to pay higher wages for a given level of slack. 
  The market will be in disequilibrium in the sense that executives would prefer to work at a firm with 
more slack and there will be excess supply for such jobs.  It will be in equilibrium, however, in the sense 
that the boards at such firms derive utility from the overpayment and would not accept an offer from an 
executive to work for lower pay.  
Thus, we have a model in which executive compensation rises with the size of the firm via the more 
expensive high talent that bigger firms hire, with profits via the need to induce effort; and with 
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that might affect an executive’s marginal product.  We will not attempt to solve for this model’s wage 
equation, which will depend on such unobservables as the executive’s utility function and how 
reservation utilities depend on talent.  Rather, we will estimate a reduced form to see how the wage 
depends on size, profit, governance, and control variables, and we will try various measures of those 
variables.  
The model is limiting in several respects. It assumes that executives have the same utility as a 
function of compensation, where in fact we would expect the marginal utility of compensation to depend 
on wealth.  Wealthy executives will tend to invest in ways that diversify away some of the risks specific 
to the firms they run.  As a result, to motivate them to maximize firm value, rational employers might 
pay them a riskier compensation package then they would pay an executive without that diversified 
investment portfolio.
12   In addition, to the extent that an executive’s capital income comes from 
investments outside the firm his income—which is what we measure—will not vary with the firm’s 
profitability.  We will adjust for this in the same way we did when estimating executive compensation, 
by separating out the Capitalists. 
Separating out the Capitalists is also important because the effect of governance slack could be very 
different for the companies they run.  Concentrated ownership, for example, can reduce governance 
slack by giving the lead shareholders ample incentive to monitor the board of directors, but if ownership 
is concentrated in the CEO, the concentration will increase governance slack in our model, as the board 
will weight profits (which must be shared with minority shareholders ) less and overpayment more. 
Endogeneity is an additional problem.  The stake that an executive holds in his firm depends on his 
compensation.  If he earned a high salary in 2004, he probably earned high salaries in several preceding 
years too.  Indeed, the 593 presidents who appeared on the high-income taxpayer list in 2004 had 
12 To the extent presidents do not diversify, of course, firms would not need to pay them higher powered compensation 
packages.  Our Capitalist dataset below includes presidents who hold very large interests in the firm.   Page 25
appeared a mean 7.3 times; 322 had appeared at least five times, and 155 had appeared at least ten. 
Over the years, no doubt they saved some of their earnings, and many invested those savings in the firm. 
Necessarily, then, any corporate governance variable involving the shares held by the president himself 
is endogenous.  In addition, as we will see below, any test of the capture hypothesis is plagued by the 
possibility that governance variables are endogenously chosen to increase productivity at a given firm 
rather than to protect the executive.   Crucially, however, this is a problem for any study of executive 
compensation -- it is not caused by our aggregation of capital and labor income.  
C.  The Variables
  The next step is to choose observable measures of executive compensation and firm size, profit, and 
governance slack, and to decide what control variables to include.   The Appendix contains detailed 
definitions of the variables, but we will explain them here in enough detail for the reader to understand 
the regressions.       
The first set of variables is at the level of the individual executive.  We will use an executive’s tax 
liability as our proxy for income.   We will use a logarithmic specification in accordance with the 
common finding of a constant elasticity of pay with respect to firm size.  Our data also includes the total 
number of appearances an executive has made on the high-income taxpayer list conditional upon 
appearing in 2004, and we will also try using this cruder proxy for income.   A number of other 
executive-level variables might be expected to affect an executive’s income.  These include whether he 
holds positions at multiple firms, his share holdings in the firm which employs him, and his age, all of 
which we would expect to increase income.  
Other variables are at the level of the corporation.  We have several possible measures for size, which 
we expect to have a positive effect on executive income.   The most conventional is the amount of the    Page 26
firm’s assets, but we also will try the firm’s market capitalization and its sales.  To test the incentive 
theory, we will use the firm’s return on assets and its stock price growth.  We will also include a variable 
for whether the firm had an option program for its executives, which we would expect to increase 
income under the incentive theory, and for whether the firm used American-style SEC accounting in its 
public reports.  We do not know what effect this might have on executive pay, but since it affects the 
levels of variables such as assets we include it as a conditioning variable. 
The governance variables that we use to test the capture theory are also at the firm level.  Here, the 
difficulty of choosing variables becomes greater. ``Governance slack’’ could have more than one cause, 
and what indicates slack at one company might not at another.  The first variable we include is whether 
the firm is a family company (of a family other than the CEO’s), as measured by two board members 
having the same last name or a board member having the same name as the company.   A family 
company might have tighter governance because of historical continuity with control by the founding 
shareholders, and so would pay less under the capture theory.  Concentration of ownership would also 
result in tighter governance, since the executive could not so easily control elections to the board of 
directors, so we will use two measures of concentration: the fraction of the company owned by the top 
five shareholders, and the fraction owned by members of the board other than the executive.  The size of 
the board would matter if a large board results in less effort by board members, and a large board would 
result in higher pay.  The percentage of independent, non-employee, directors is the variable that has 
attracted the most attention in reform efforts, and would tighten governance and reduce slack.  Finally, 
one might expect that if the average tenure of board members is higher or they are older, their interests 
would be more aligned with those of the CEO and his pay would be higher.   
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1.  Main results.   Table V shows the results of four specifications of a tobit regression for the 
determinants of executive income (as explained earlier, we use tobit because we do not observe tax bills 
under 10 million yen).  All specifications include industry dummies and a dummy for whether the firm 
followed American-style SEC accounting rules.
13  In specification (a) we aggregate Company Men and 
Capitalists; in the others we keep them separate.  In specifications (a) and (b) we include only firm size 
and profitability variables; in specification (c) we add variables such as age that potentially capture 
executive productivity; and in specification (d) we add variables that potentially reflect governance 
slack. Specification (d)   thus estimates the full theoretical model described above.   By contrast, in 
specifications (a), (b), and (c) we assume that the full model’s governance slack variable, s, takes the 
value of zero. 
  [Insert Table V here.]
According to specification (a), executive income has an elasticity with respect to firm size of .18 and 
increases with profitability (the semi-elasticity is 4.7%).  It does not increase with stock price growth. 
Because the regression aggregates executives with and without capital income, however, we take these 
conclusions with caution, and focus on the next three regressions.  There, we disaggregate the two 
groups of executives. 
2.Exposition.  First, let us explain the presentation of regressions (b), (c) and (d) in Table V (and  the 
regressions in  the remaining tables).  For each regression, we provide two columns.  Column (i)  gives 
the variable’s effect on Company Men, and  column (ii)  gives its additional effect on Capitalists.  These 
two effects provide fundamentally different information.  The effect on Company Men gives the pure 
13 As Table V shows, the accounting system does not come in significant.  We do not report the industry dummies, but 
they turn out to be unimportant (though note that we have excluded banks from our sample already).     Page 28
effect of the variables on executive pay (though many Company Men do earn some capital income).  By 
contrast, the extra effects on Capitalists potentially come from two sources:  from the CEO's investment 
income, and from any pay difference caused by varying levels of governance slack among CEO-
controlled firms.
More specifically, each of these two effects gives the marginal effect on the log of an executive’s tax 
liability of an increase in the independent variable, as computed at the median.
14  The number 0.263 in 
column (b-i) indicates that a rise of X in the log of company assets increases the log of executive income 
by .263*X.  Because both variables are in logarithms, the elasticity of income with respect to assets is 
+26.3%.  The number -0.034 in column (b-ii) is the additional effect for Capitalists -- which we take 
from the coefficient on the interaction variable Log(Assets)*Capitalist.  Hence, the total elasticity of 
income with respect to firm assets for Capitalists is .263 + .034 = .297.  
Much the same interpretation applies to the t-statistics.  The t-statistic of 8.87 on the coefficient 0.263 
tells us that the effect of assets on pay is significantly different from zero for Company Men.  The t-
statistic of 0.60 on the coefficient 0.034 tells us that the effect of assets on pay for Capitalists is 
insignificantly different from the effect of assets on that of Company Men.  To test for whether the 
effect of size on the pay of Capitalists is significantly different from zero,  we need to do an F-test test 
on the sum of the coefficients.  Doing so yields the highly significant F-statistic of 34.09. 
Discrete variables must be interpreted somewhat differently. The number 6.732 in column (b-i) is the 
constant. It represents the effect on Log(Tax Liability) of simply being in the dataset.  The number .805 
14  In many tobit regressions (e.g., those in Ramseyer & Rasmusen (2003)), the regression coefficients have little meaning 
in themselves and must be converted to “marginal effects” by seeing how their effect on the underlying indicator variable 
translates into a change in the expected value of the observed variable.  That does not apply here.  Here, we use tobit because 
we do not observe the exact levels of taxes paid if they are below 10 million yen, not because the minimum level of taxes an 
executive can legally pay is 10 million no matter what his income.  We are not interested in how independent variables affect 
the expected “observed level of taxes”, which is usually the censoring bound of 10 million, but in how they affect the taxes 
themselves.  A predicted level of taxes below the censoring bound—8 million, for example--- makes sense in our regression, 
unlike in the typical tobit setting. Thus the tobit coefficient itself, the “linear predictor”, is the correct measure of the 
marginal effect.    Page 29
in column (b-ii) is the effect on Log(Tax Liability) of being a Capitalist, computed using a “Capitalist” 
dummy.  Accordingly, the conditional mean log income tax for Capitalists is 6.732 + .805 = 7.537.  For 
discrete variables that have small effects (e.g., Option Program in column (c-i), with its marginal effect 
of 0.187), the effect is close to the percentage increase.  For an increase in its log from 6.732 to 7.537, 
however Tax rises not by 80.5% but by 124%.
3.  Executive-level variables.  Specifications (b) and (c) reflect a model that excludes the capture 
theory a priori (in effect, a model that assumes s=0).  We include regression (b) as a robustness check 
because it uses only the variables most commonly included in executive pay regressions.  In this simpler 
specification, the impact of size, profitability, and stock growth is much the same as in specification (c). 
Given that specification (c) includes the executive-level variables, we shall focus primarily on it in the 
discussion below.  
Specification (c) shows that income rises with the size of the company for both types of executives. 
Studies based on U.S. ExecuComp data reach much the same conclusion.  In their various specifications, 
for example, Gabaix & Landier (2008) find elasticities ranging from .26 to .37.  For Company Men, we 
find that income rises by 2.17% for each 10% increase in size.  For Capitalists, we find no significant 
difference.  Thus we obtain Finding 2. 
Finding 2: Executive pay in Japan rises with company size at a rate of 2.17% for each 10% increase in 
assets. 
An increase in a firm's stock price raises the income of Capitalists but not of Company Men.  This 
phenomenon is what one would expect -- not from any need for incentives, but simply from their stock    Page 30
ownership.  By contrast, profitability measured as return on assets has a positive and significant effect 
on the income of both groups of executives.  Thus we obtain Finding 3. 
Finding 3:  Stock price growth fails to explain differences in the incomes of employee CEO’s in Japan, 
but their incomes do rise by 3.4% with each additional 1% of accounting profitability.   
Studies of American CEOs beginning with Jensen & Murphy (1990) have routinely found that 
performance has a small effect on CEO pay.  We find that a 1% increase in the level of performance 
(e.g. from 4% to 5%) is associated with a 3.4% increase in pay (at that starting level, an elasticity of .
14).   Using Japanese tax data similar to ours, Basu, Hwang, Mitsudome & Weintrop (2007) similarly 
find a positive effect of accounting profit on executive income, but they do not distinguish Company 
Men from Capitalists.  
Using survey data on a panel of 51 Japanese firms from 1986 to 1995, Kato & Kubo (2006) find that 
return on assets has a statistically significant effect on executive pay, but at a lower magnitude:   a 1% 
increase in performance leads to a 1.4% increase in pay.  In part, their lower magnitude could result 
from a difference in the period covered:  their data include the years before and during the 1990s 
recession, while our year dates after its end.   Or, the differences between Kabo & Kubo's results and 
ours might reflect the different methodology.   We use cross-sectional data from one year to ask 
whether performance explains pay differences among firms.  By contrast, Kato & Kubo use panel data 
to ask whether year-to-year changes in performance at a single firm affect the CEO's pay.  If executives 
at more profitable firms earn higher pay, that difference would be captured by their firm-level fixed 
effects and would not appear in their 1.4% increase.  We find that more profitable firms pay more; they 
find that firms which become more profitable pay more.   Page 31
 Our executive-level control variables generate several significant results.  First, Company Men who 
hold positions at multiple companies earn higher incomes (the coefficient is .395), but the total effect of 
such multiple positions on Capitalists (.127 = .395 - .268) is insignificantly different from 0 (F=.60).  Of 
the 1,048 Company Man presidents, 12.5 percent held multiple positions, but only 9.7 percent of the 383 
Capitalist presidents did.  Perhaps the Capitalist presidents do not earn additional income from their 
multiple positions because they hold the extra positions at affiliate firms.  Hajime Satomi, for example, 
served as president and board chairman at the Sega Sammy Holdings entertainment empire, but also 
worked as president of the constituent video-game firm, Sammy Networks.   Toshifumi Suzuki 
simultaneously served as chairman of the board of the Ito Yokado supermarket chain and the affiliated 
convenience store chain Seven-Eleven Japan.  We hesitate to push this explanation, however, because of 
the few presidents involved.  Only 20 presidents of family firms in our dataset held additional board 
positions, and only 27 presidents who qualified as top-10 shareholders did so -- and 10 of the two groups 
overlapped.  With so few datapoints, the phenomenon could also represent an artifact of small  numbers. 
Second, Company Men who hold positions at firms with option programs also earn higher incomes 
(the coefficient is .187), but the total effect of the programs on Capitalists (.030 =.187-.153) is again 
insignificant (F=.11).  Of our Capitalist presidents 40 percent had an option program while only 25 
percent of the Company Men did.    
Third, an executive’s income increases with age, at about 2.2% per year.  This phenomenon holds 
whether he is a Capitalist or Company Man.
   Finally, an executive's income increases with the value of his shareholdings.  Unfortunately, we 
have shareholding data only on the Capitalists -- our data extend only to the top 10 shareholders, and by 
definition all such shareholders are Capitalists.     Page 32
4.   Governance variables.   Specification (d) includes our governance variables.
15   First, firms 
controlled by a family other than the executive’s own family pay Company Men presidents less, with a 
coefficient of -.234.  For Capitalists, the total effect is insignificant (F= .14, p=.71).  
Second, firms in which the top 5 shareholders hold a large interest pay Company Men less (a 0.5% 
decline per 1% increase in top 5 ownership), though the effect is significant only at the 10% level.  By 
contrast, they pay Capitalists significantly more (a highly significant net effect of -.5 + 2.0 = 1.5 percent, 
F = 11.98).  This accords with the idea that slack governance may result both from dispersed ownership 
when the CEO is not a major owner, and from concentrated ownership when the CEO is himself one of 
the controlling owners.  
Third, firms whose directors have long tenure pay Company Men more,  but those with an older 
board of directors (conditioning on board tenure) pay them less.  The tenure effect is consistent with the 
hypothesis that presidents "capture" long-running boards, but the age effect contradicts the capture 
theory’s prediction that longer relationships will make for easier capture.
The other governance variables do not have statistically significant effects for either Company Men 
or Capitalists.   Observers have sometimes argued that board members with large ownership stakes 
would monitor the firm more closely.  In fact, firms where board members other than the president hold 
large amounts of stock do not pay their presidents less.  Observers similarly argue that small boards may 
monitor a firm more closely.  In fact, firms with small boards do not pay their presidents less either. 
And observers often argue that independent directors will monitor the firm more closely.  Again, firms 
with higher percentages of independent directors do not pay their presidents less.  
A test for all the governance coefficients equaling zero rejects that hypothesis with F= 8.43, which is 
highly significant.  Finding 4 summarizes our results. 
15 In earlier versions of this article, we also included a dummy variable for whether a firm had adopted a "U.S.-style" 
board committee structure available under the new Japanese corporate code.  Consistently, the calculated coefficients were 
insignificant.  Unfortunately, inclusion of the variable in the specifications used in this version cause tobit not to converge. 
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Finding 4:  Family companies, firms with more ownership concentrated in the top 5 shareholders, and 
those with older board members have employee presidents with lower incomes, while employee 
presidents whose board members have longer average tenure have higher incomes.  Board size, the 
percentage of outside directors, and the stock holdings of directors other than the executive have no 
significant effect. 
Although Finding 4 lends some (albeit haphazard) support to a "capture" theory of executive 
compensation, the results are generally also consistent with a market theory.  Family companies and 
firms with more concentrated ownership might have greater control over employee executives, for 
example, but that very fact means that they have less need or desire for a more talented (and expensive) 
executive.  Shareholders in firms with longer-running boards may retain the board members because 
they have done so well.  If those boards pay their presidents high salaries, perhaps they pay them well 
because the executives perform well on dimensions unobserved in the regression.  
Several differences between our results and those of Basu, Hwang, Mitsudome & Weintrop (2007) 
stem from their decision not to distinguish between presidents with larger and smaller stakes in the firm. 
For example, they find that the share of the firm owned by board members has a significant positive 
effect on executive pay, where we find a negative effect for Company Men.  They correctly note that 
this positive effect might reflect capital income -- an observation that would reconcile our findings with 
theirs.   They similarly find that family firms (defined somewhat differently) have higher executive 
incomes.  Again, however, they note that this may reflect the fact that family executives earn substantial 
investment incomes.     Page 34
5.  Accounting rules.  Whether a firm uses Japanese or U.S. (SEC) accounting rules has no significant 
effect on observed tax liability.   We experimented with interacting the accounting variable with 
Profitability.  If we take the simple specification (a) of Table V, for example, whether we include SEC 
Accounting*Profitability, the coefficients on Profitability and Profitability*Capitalist remain largely 
unchanged.  The coefficient on SEC Accounting*Profitability itself is insignificant.
6.  Explaining Differences in Incomes from 2003 to 2004. The panel data available to us is limited, 
but we do have data for the amount of income tax paid in 2003 as well as in 2004.  For executives who 
paid more than 10 million in tax in both years, we can look at what might explain the change in their 
incomes over time.  This is a smaller sample, and it being selected for high incomes  makes it subject to 
our criticism of previous studies.  It does, however, have the advantage that by looking at differences 
across time we implicitly adjust for executive- or firm-specific effects. Thus, in Table VI we estimate 
the determinants of pay in first differences. For the 484 presidents who paid at least 10 million yen in 
taxes in both years, we calculate the change in their tax liability, an increase for 253 and a decline for 
131 of them.  We then regress this change on fractional increases in the return on assets (which is 
negative for 129 firms), sales (121), and the stock price (52). We omit other variables such as company 
size because those change slowly or seldom enough across time that we would not expect them to 
explain year-to-year changes in pay. The regressions are in levels rather than logs (as we used in Table 
V) because so many of the variables take negative values.  We also include a dummy for SEC-style 
accounting, since that could be correlated with accounting profitability, and we allow separate intercepts 
for Capitalists and Company Men. 
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  Regression (a) shows that in a regression using all 439 presidents for whom both the tax variable and 
the other variables were all available nothing is statistically significant (not even the constants) except 
for the effect of stock price growth on Capitalists, which takes the expected positive value.   Our 
dependent variable, the change in tax liability, however, includes extreme outliers.  Its median value is 
1,592 thousand yen, but it varies from -220,320   to 828,817 thousand.  Trimming at the 5
th and 95
th 
percentile values of -11,271 and 37,869 thousand yen yields regressions (b) and (c).   After removing the 
outliers, a number of  coefficients become statistically significant, most notably accounting profitability, 
which has a positive effect for Company Men but a significantly less positive effect for Capitalists (for a 
net effect of about zero on Capitalists; an F-test rejects zero with only p=.81).  The coefficient of 
accounting profitability has a coefficient of  707, which corresponds to an elasticity of the change in tax 
with respect to a change in profitability for Company Men of .16 (= 700*.80/3453) at the  means for the 
sample used in the regression and  .22 (= 700*.50/1592) at the medians.  These are comparable to the 
elasticity of .14 found from the cross-section regressions in Table V.  Since these results do, in effect, 
adjust for firm-specific effects, like those in Kato & Kubo (2006),  but have a larger magnitude they 
suggest that incentive pay is more important than Kato & Kubo found, at least for this later time period. 
Other variables in regression (b) are also significant.  The rate of sales growth has an insignificant 
effect on the income of Company Men, but an additional positive effect (and overall positive effect; an 
F-test yields p=.02) for Capitalists.   Stock price growth is insignificant for Company Men, with a 
significantly higher effect on Capitalists but an overall effect that is insignificant (at p=.22 for the F-
test).  The constant is positive and not significantly different for Capitalists, indicating that incomes rose 
on average for executives adjusting for the other included variables, and the presidents of firms that used 
SEC-style accounting had incomes that were significantly higher, an effect of very large magnitude.    Page 36
This effect is so large as to make us suspect that it is not to due the accounting itself, but to something 
else correlated with a firm’s adoption of SEC-style accounting.  We ran Regression (c) without the SEC-
style accounting variable as a check to see if it was affecting our results.  It seems it was not; regression 
(c) has much the same results as regression (b) in both significances and coefficient sizes. 
Thus, the regressions on differences in tax paid across the two years available to us confirm our 
finding that accounting profitability does matter to executive salaries, but stock price growth does not. 
   
                  V.    Alternative Regression Techniques and Variable Measures
A.  Alternative Measures of Size and Performance
In Table VII, we repeat our basic regression  with different measures of  firm size and performance.  
First, because some studies of U.S. executive compensation measure firm size by sales or market 
capitalization, we try using those measures in place of assets.   Size is significant for any of these size 
measures, and the elasticity of executive income with respect to size varies only from .217 for assets 
to .252 for market capitalization to .194 for sales.     
Second, we ask whether Log(Mean Capitalization) (the mean capitalization of  firm  in the same 
industry) and Relative Profitability (the difference between a firm’s  Profitability and the industry 
mean)  help explain compensation. They do not.
  The matching theory of Gabaix and Landier (2008) says that market capitalization is the key 
determinant of executive pay and suggests that pay is affected by a “reference firm size” that could be 
special to a year or an industry.  In regression (d), Log(Capitalization) is significant, but Log(Mean 
Capitalization) is not. Executives’ incomes are not pulled up for all firms in an industry just because 
most of its firms are large and pay more.   The unimportance of mean industry capitalization is evidence    Page 37
against the executive market being segmented by industry; in the assortative matching of our market 
theory, the fact that a large firm in an industry with generally small firms does not pay less than if it 
were in an industry of large firms shows that it is competing with firms outside its industry for the most 
talented executives.   
In   regression   (e),  Profitability  and  Relative   Profitability  are   both   insignificant.   The 
unimportance of relative profitability is a longstanding puzzle of executive compensation, as discussed 
in e. g., Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001), who have labeled the puzzle ``pay-for-luck”.  Our model 
above does not explain it, but one possibility is that higher manager effort is optimal for the firm 
following observable positive demand shocks, and this results in higher pay, as  Baranchuk, MacDonald 
& Yang (2006) suggest. 
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B.  Robustness Checks: Alternative Regression Techniques and Definitions of Capitalist
In Table VIII we offer four alternative regressions of executive compensation, again with results very 
close to those above.  We include a tobit regression with logged tax liability that captures the principal 
results found above (Column (a)); an OLS regression with logged tax liability on only those presidents 
who appeared on the TSR high-income taxpayer list (Column (b), which is the technique used in Kato & 
Rockel [1992]); a probit regression using the  High Income TP  dummy as the dependent variable 
(Column (c)); and a Poisson regression using the number of times an executive appeared on that list 
(Num Appearances) as the dependent variable (Column (d)), with zeroes omitted since they are too 
numerous for a Poisson distribution to be appropriate.  For expositional simplicity, we focus on those 
variables that most strongly affect compensation. Regressions (b) (OLS)  and (c) (the probit on being a 
high-income taxpayer) show that whether we use tobit or OLS, company size and accounting    Page 38
profitability are significantly related to executive income, though  with reduced coefficient sizes, and 
stock return is not.  The Poisson regression for number of appearances is quite different, with company 
size and accounting profitability insignificant and stock return having the wrong sign for Company Men. 
An explanation for this might be that number of appearances is related to the length of time for which a 
company retains the same president as much as how much it pays him, conditional on an executive ever 
appearing on the list.    
Panel B of Table VIII shows how the definition of Capitalist affects a regression of log tax liability 
on the principal variables.  Our standard definition is that a Capitalist either (i) was among the top ten 
shareholders of his firm or (ii) worked at his family firm.  Alternatively, one might add (iii) executives 
who appeared on the high-income taxpayer list five or more times, or (iv) were under age 40.  Panel A’s 
regression (a) is our standard definition.  Panel B’s regressions (a), (b), (c) and (d) show that varying the 
combination of the four criteria makes little difference to the regression results except that (c), dropping 
executives who worked at their family firm,  results in size of firm having a much smaller (though still 
significant) effect on the income of Company Men. 
 
Insert Table VIII      here
           VI. Concluding Remarks 
Most studies of executive pay use data on labor income (salary, bonus, and options), but lack data on 
investment income, though executive response to salary incentives depends on their entire portfolios. 
To date, studies of Japanese executives have lacked good data even on pay, in contrast to studies using 
the detailed executive pay filings required by the SEC.  Lacking direct data on salaries, we instead use    Page 39
tax records.  Standard data from corporate filings plus this unusual tax data combine to give us a dataset 
with corporation and executive characteristics, executive incomes (labor plus investment income), and 
an estimate of executive compensation for some firms. 
We find that Japanese executives earn far less than U.S. executives.  Firm size held constant, they 
earn about one-fifth as much as their U.S. peers.  Using tobit regressions, we conclude that executive 
salaries in Japan increase at a rate of 22% of the increase in assets.  Salaries also increase with age and 
accounting profitability, but not with stock returns.  Corporate governance variables are subject to the 
usual endogeneity problems, but family firms, firms with large lead shareholders, and firms with older 
board members appear to pay less and those whose board members have longer tenure pay more.     Page 40
       Appendix: The Regression Variables
(a) Executive variables 
Log(Tax Liability):  the log of an executive’s 2004 tax liability (in 1000 yen), as reported by TSR. 
Executives not on the TSR list paid less than 10 million yen, and for them, we enter the log of 10,000.
D Tax Liab:  the increase in an executive's tax liability from 2003 to 2004.
High Income TP:  1 if the executive paid at least 10 million yen in taxes in 2004; 0 otherwise.
Num Appearances:  the number of times the executive appeared on the high-income taxpayer list 
(including 2004, but conditional on appearing on the 2004 list).
Multiple Positions:  1 if the executive holds positions in at least two firms; 0 otherwise.
Exec Share Value:  the value of the firm’s shares held by the executive in millions of yen, but 0 if 
the executive is not one of the top 10 shareholders.  
Exec Age:  2005 minus the executive’s year of birth.
(b) Corporation variables 
Log(Capitalization):  the log of the value of the firm’s stock, as of the close of the calendar 2004 
year.
Log(Mean Capitalization):  the log of the mean capitalization for all firms in a given industry.
Log(Assets):  the log of the firm’s assets in for the fiscal year ending in 2005, in 100 million yen.
Log(Sales):  the log of the firm’s sales (for the fiscal year ending in 2004; consolidated), in 1 million 
yen.
D Sales:  the fractional increase in the firm’s sales from the fiscal year ending in 2003 to the year 
ending in 2004.   Page 41
Profitability:  the firm’s operating income (for the fiscal year ending in 2004; million yen) divided 
by its assets (fiscal year ending in 2005; million yen) times 100.
D Profitability:  the fractional increase in Profitability from the fiscal year ending in 2003 to the 
year ending in 2004.
Relative Profitability:  the difference between the firm's Profitability and the mean Profitability 
for all firms in its industry.
Negative Profitability:  1 if a firm's Profitability was negative, 0 otherwise.
Stock Price Growth:  the fractional increase in the price of the firm’s stock, from June 2003 to June 
2004.  We do not correct for splits, redemptions, or dividends.
SEC Accounting:  1 if the firm reported its financials by U.S. accounting principles in 2004.  Of the 
1,568 firms in our database, 66 chose to do so.
Option Program:  1 if the firm had a stock option program by the end of 2004; 0 otherwise.
Industry dummies:  One of 32 industries given by Toyo keizai simpo sha (2005b).
(c) Corporation governance variables (for 2004)
Family Company:  1 if at least two board members had the same last name, or the firm’s name (e.g., 
Casio) was the same as that of at least one board member (e.g., Kashio).
Top 5 share %:  the percentage of the firm’s shares held by the largest 5 shareholders (at the close of 
the fiscal year ending in 2005).
Other Board Share %:  the total percentage of the firm’s shares held the members of the board 
other than the executive.
Board age:  the mean age of the members of the board.
Board tenure:  the mean tenure of the members of the board.   Page 42
Board size:  the number of directors on the board.
Ind dir %:  the percentage of directors with past or concurrent positions at other firms in 2004.  This 
is a broader definition than that used in the statute governing the new governance structure. That 
definition excludes any director with a past tie to an affiliated firm -- a definition that is hard for the 
outside researcher to apply without a complete work history for each director; see generally Kanda 
(2006: 83).   Page 43
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Table I
 Estimating a Taxpayer’s Income from His Tax Liability
The amount of income that would generate a tax liability of 10 million yen is about 39.9 million yen.  To reach this conclusion, we 
make the following calculations:
A.  The Principles:
1.  Assume the taxpayer has only salary income.  If so, he will have the standard salary income deduction of 5 percent 
plus 1,700,000 yen.  See Shotoku zei ho [Income Tax Act], Law No. 33 of 1965, Sec. 28.
2.  Assume further that this taxpayer has no children, no life insurance, no charitable donations, no medical expenses, 
etc.  If so, he will have only the three basic personal deductions:  his own deduction, his spouse' deduction, and a social security 
deduction.  Assume the last equals 1 million yen (in fact, it varies by salary level).  See Shotoku zei ho, Secs. 74, 83, 86.  
* Basic personal deduction    380,000 yen
* Spousal deduction   380,000
* Social security deduction 1,000,000 
3.  A taxpayer with an income in this range will face the full maximum marginal rate:  37 percent.  The actual amount 
of the tax is given as 37 percent of his income, less a deduction of 2.49 million yen.  
4.  This taxpayer will also have the currently standard lump-sum tax credit of 250,000 yen.  Shotokuzei to futan keigen 
sochi ho [Act to Reduce the Burden of the Income Tax], Law. 8 of 1999, Sec. 6.
B.  Tax calculation:
Gross income: 39,900,000
Salary income:
   39,900,000 x .95 - 1,700,000 = 36,205,000
Taxable income:
 36,205,000
      380,000
      380,000
  - 1,000,000
   34,445,000 34,445,000 
Income Tax:
   34,445,000 x .37 - 2,490,000 =  10,254,650
Less lump-sum tax credit:
   10,254,650 - 250,000 =  10,004,650
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Table II
Corporations and Their Presidents: Summary Statistics
Sources:  Tokyo shoko risaachi, Zenkoku kogaku nozeisha meibo:  Jojo gaisha ban [Roster of High-Income Taxpayers] (CD-ROM, 
2005); Toyo keizai shimposha, Yakuin shikiho [Board of Directors Report:  Listed Companies] (Toyo keizai shimposha, 2005); Nihon 
keizai shimbun sha, Nikkei kaisha joho:  Natsu [Nikkei Corporate Information:  Summer] (Tokyo:  Nihon keizai shimbun sha, 2005); Toyo 
keizai shimposha, Kabuka chaato:  Natsu [Stock Price Charts:  Summer] (Tokyo:  Toyo keizai shimposha, CD-ROM, 2005); Toyo keizai 
shimposha, Kaisha shiki ho:  Natsu [Corporate Report:  Summer] (Tokyo:  Toyo keizai shimposha, CD-ROM, 2005); Toyo keizai 
shimposha, Yakuin shikiho:  jojo gaisha ban [Board of Directors Report:  Listed Companies] (Tokyo:  Toyo keizai shimposha, 2005)
A. Corporations
                        Percent  Minimum                          Median      Maximum
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________     
Assets (in 100 million yen) 14 878.5 344889
Profitability (oper inc/cap)  -1.00 .52 10.88
Stock Returns (04-03) -.99 .18 7.39
Family corp. (def. in App.) 27.3
Largest shareholder is corp. 86.6
Option Programs 29.1 
Percent shares held by
Largest shareholder 3.1 11.9 90.6
Largest 5 shareholders 7.5 33.9 98.2
Largest 10 shareholders 9 45.9 98.9
Board (excl. executive) 0 .50 60.5
Boards 
Size  5 13 55
Percent outside directors 0 37.5 100
Average age 38.3 59.6 72.1
B. Presidents
                       Percent      Minimum    Median      Maximum
_______________________________________________________________________________    _   
Tax paid (if on TSR list; 1000 yen) 10,003 19,662 1,083,937
Age 33 61.6 90
Years on the tax list -- 1 7.3 33
% holding multiple positions 11.7
% of employer’s shares held    ---- 0 0 60.7   Page 52
Table III
                       The Incomes of Top Corporate Officers
“High-income roster” refers to all taxpayers paying more than 10 million yen in taxes in 2004.  “Estimated taxable income” is 
calculated by estimating the taxable income that would generate the amount given, and converting to $U.S. at the December 31, 2004 rate 
of 102.68 yen/$.  We assume the taxpayer has three personal deductions:  a basic deduction of 380,000 yen, a deduction for spouse of 
380,000 yen, and a deduction for social security of 1,000,000. “Highest paid officer” is the higher paid of the two directors listed first in the 
rosters given in the Yakuin shikiho, taken from securities filings.  “Top 2 officers” are the two directors listed first in the board rosters 
given in Yakuin shikiho, taken from securities filings. The data set includes all firms listed in Section 1 of the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
except banks.    
Sources:  Tokyo shoko risaachi, Zenkoku kogaku nozeisha meibo:  Jojo gaisha ban [Roster of High-Income Taxpayers] (CD-ROM, 
2005); Toyo keizai shimposha, Yakuin shikiho [Board of Directors Report:  Listed Companies] (Toyo keizai shimposha, 2005).
Note that our findings in Table IV  will suggest that incomes on average exceed executive compensations by some 40%. 
A.  Median Amounts and Ranks:
Percentage in Median        Taxpayer         Median
High-Income Tax Liability  Rank Estimated Taxable Income
                                   Roster                                            (x 1,000 yen)                           (All)                                                                               ..    
1.  Highest Paid Officer:
   Top 100  77.0 17,997  26,412 U.S. $610,031
   Top 500 65.4 15,554 35,092         $542,345
   Al1 51.8 10,483 70,139         $401,013
2.  President (rank):
   Top 100  67.9 15,259 35,092        $534,164
   Top 500 53.3 11,152 63,183        $420,374
   All   41.4   --
 3. Top 2 Officers:
   Top 100  50.1 10,508 69,508       $402,532
   Top 500 42.2   -- 
   All   31.5   -- 
B.  Selected High-Income Executives:
       Tax Liability                Rank among:            .    
Name                                                    Position                                                                     (x 1,000 yen)                        Executives           All taxpayers     
Tadashi Yanai   Chairman, Fast Retailing   1,083,937    1   3
Yasumitsu Shigeta   Chairman, Hikari Comm.          549,430    5  29
Masaya Nakamura   Chairman, Namuko (Services)      375,799  10  68
Hidetoshi Yasukawa     Pres., Gold Crest (Real est.)      205,219   20 224
Yoshihiko Miyauchi      Chairman, Orix (Financial)      142,847  35 422
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Figure 1
The Distribution of Taxes Paid by Corporate Presidents 
Note:  The figure gives the fraction of the 504 presidents of firms listed in Section 1 of the Tokyo Stock Exchange who pay various 
levels of taxes, excluding those who pay less than 10 million or the 89 who earned more than 50 million yen.  The horizontal bins are in 2- 
million yen increments.  Source:  Tokyo shoko risaachi, Zenkoku kogaku nozeisha meibo:  Jojo gaisha ban [Roster of High-Income 
Taxpayers] (CD-ROM, 2005).   Page 54
Table IV 
 The Incomes of Capitalists and Company Men: Levels
“High-income roster” refers to all taxpayers paying more than 10 million yen in taxes in 2004. "Capitalists" are 
presidents who are among the top 10 shareholders of the firm, or who work at their own family firm (as defined in the 
Appendix).  "Company Men" are all other presidents.  Banks are excluded.  For sources, see Table II.
_______________________________________________________________________________
I.  Summary Statistics:
                          Capitalists               _                Company Men                  _        
Fraction in Median Fraction in Median       
High-Income Tax Liability High-Income Tax Liability   
                         Roster                     (x 1,000 yen)             n                             Roster                     (x 1,000 yen)               n  .    
   Top 100  100% 209,180      4 67% 14,289     73
   Top 500 75   22,185   55 50 10,005   362
   All 66   57,409 383 32 -- 1047
II.  Number of Presidents Paying Taxes Above (Million Yen) --
                                        10                      30                      50                      70                      90                      110                    130.               All
   Capitalists 254 137 78 48 28 21 17   383
   Company Men 339   35 11   6   6   3   2 1048
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        Table V 
Determinants of the Taxable Income of Corporate Presidents
The dependent variable is Log Tax Liability, and the regressions are tobit, using Stata 9.  All regressions include industry dummies.  The data 
cover all non-bank firms listed on Section 1 of the Tokyo Stock Exchange.  Under the coefficients are the absolute values of the corresponding 
z statistics.  Significant effects are boldfaced, and given one, two and three stars for significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% levels. The “Capitalist 
Extra Effects” columns represent the coefficient on the interaction variable X*(Capitalist dummy) -- that is, the additional effect of the 
executive being a Capitalist.  "Capitalists" are corporate presidents who either are among the top 10 shareholders of the firm or who work at 
their own family firm (as defined in the Appendix).  "Company Men" are all other corporate executives.  For sources, see Table II.  The 
number of observations varies from 1,345 to 1,352.
________________________________________________________________________________________________
  (a) (b)(i)  (b)(ii) (c)(i)  (c)(ii) (d)(i)  (d)(ii)
Company Capitalist Company Capitalist Company Capitalist
                                           Men              Ext effect           Men              Ext effect           Men           Ext effect.    
Constant 7.569*** 6.732*** .805** 5.561*** 1.376** 6.707*** .257
(31.27) (27.08) (1.98) (11.82) (2.16) (8.04) (0.21)
Log (Assets) .180*** .263*** .034 .217*** -.027 .237*** .001
(6.08) (8.87) (0.60) (7.54) (0.48) (7.17) (0.02)
Profitability .047*** .034*** .010 .034*** .010 .029*** .001
(6.87) (4.57) (0.83) (4.78) (0.83) (4.00) (0.09)
Stock Price Gr .019 -.134 .278** -.109 .234** -.078 .124
(0.29) (1.63) (2.27) (1.38) (2.00) (1.00) (1.06)
Multi Positions .395*** -.268 .404*** -.315*
(3.92) (1.40) (4.11) (1.70)
Option Program .187** -.153 .150* -.120
(2.32) (1.18) (1.91) (0.94)
Executive Age .022*** -.002 .027*** -.006
(3.37) (0.24) (3.79) (0.63)
Exec Share Value .078*** .061***
(5.75) (4.52)
Other Family Co -.234** .130
(2.28) (0.44)
Top 5 Shareh % -.005* .020***
(1.65) (3.85)
Board Tenure .089*** -.059**
(5.61) (2.53)
Board Age -.035** .009
(2.29) (0.42)
Oth Board Sh % .011 -.004
(1.44) (0.42)
Board Size .008 .006
(1.08) (0.40)
Ind Director % .001 .003
(0.67) (0.85)
SEC Accounting .396 .219 .265 .245
(1.45) (0.95) (1.21) (1.16)
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Table VI
Determinants of Changes in Taxable Income
The dependent variable is D  Tax Liab. The regressions are OLS and are limited to presidents of non-bank firms  listed on Section 1 of the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange  who paid at least 10 million yen in taxes in both 2003 and 2004.  Columns (b) and (c) include only presidents with 
income changes in the 5
th to 95
th percentiles. Under the coefficients are the absolute values of the corresponding z statistics.  Significant 
effects are boldfaced, and given one, two and three stars for significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% levels. The “Capitalist Extra Effects” 
columns represent the coefficient on the interaction variable X*(Capitalist dummy)-- that is, the additional effect of the executive being a 
Capitalist.  "Capitalists" are  either are among the top 10 shareholders of the firm or work at their own family.  For sources, see Table II.   
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
   (a)(i)    (a)(ii)    (b)(i)    (b)(ii)     (c)(i)    (c)(ii) 
Company  Capitalist Company  Capitalist Company  Capitalist
men extra effect  men extra effect  men extra effect 
Constant 3582.664 -3396.615 3239.506*** -739.883 3476.441*** -756.271
(0.99) (0.79) (4.30) (0.79) (2.63) (0.80)
D Profitability 0.001 -0.006           700.051*** -825.285*** 714.178*** -801.478***
(0.03) (0.18) (2.61) (2.51) (2.63) (2.42)
D Sales 80.419 1681.041 114.617 6165.561** 102.952 6072.977**
(0.03) (0.43) (0.18) (2.24) (0.16) (2.18)
Stock Price Growth -1744.773 19472.22*** -1583.435 2776.607* -1765.731 2755.631*




2 0.06 0.05 0.04
Observations 439 403 403
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Table VII 
  Determinants of Taxable Income:
Alternative Measures of Size and Performance
The dependent variable is Log Tax Liability, and the regressions are tobit.  All regressions include industry dummies except Reg (d), which would not 
converge with them.  The data cover all non-bank firms listed on Section 1 of the TSE.   Significant effects are boldfaced, and given one, two and three stars 
for significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% levels.  Z-statistics appear in parentheses.  The second column of each series (e.g., (aii)) gives the "Capitalist Extra 
Effects" -- the coefficient on interaction variable X*(Capitalist dummy).  This gives the additional effect of the executive being a Capitalist.  "Capitalists" are 
corporate presidents who either are among the top 10 shareholders of the firm or work at their own family firm (as defined in the Appendix) "Company 
Men" are all other corporate executives.  For sources, see Table II.  The number of observations varies between 1345 and 1347. 
(ai) (aii) (bi) (bii) (ci) (cii) (di) (dii) (ei) (eii)
                          Assets                 Capitalization                  Sales                  Mean Capitaliz'n             Rel Profit'y  .    
Constant 5.561  1.376 3.153 2.447 4.757 1.770 2.930 2.971 5.261 .998
(11.83)***(2.16)** (5.22)*** (2.60)*** (8.82)*** (2.28)** (2.87)*** (1.62) (7.81)***(1.43)
Ln(Assets) .217 -.027 .215 -.020
(7.54)***(0.48) (7.45)***(0.35)
Ln(Capitalizat'n) .252 -.075 .241 -.054
(9.19)*** (1.42) (8.88)*** (1.02)
Ln(Sales) .194 -.059
(6.76)*** (1.10)
Ln(Mean Capital'n) .029 -.054
(0.50) (0.53)
Profit'y .034 .010 .015 .011 .028 .011 .019 .010 .112 .061
(4.78)***(0.83) (2.11)** (0.95) (3.93)*** (0.96) (2.67)*** (0.92) (1.13) (1.50)
Rel Profitability -.077 -.055
(0.77) (1.32)
Stock Price Growth -.109 .234 -.127 .241 -.102 .242 -.089 .220 -.113 .232
(1.38) (2.00)** (1.61) (2.07)** (1.31) (2.08)** (1.23) (1.93)* (1.42)(1.98)**
Multi Offices .395 -.268 .376 -.249 .428 -.274 .367 -.288 .403 -.287
(3.92)***(1.40) (3.79)*** (1.32) (4.23)*** (1.42) (3.80)*** (1.53) (4.00)***(1.50)
Option Program .187 -.153 .123 .111 .197 -.165 .153 -.133 .194 -.176
(2.32)** (1.18) (1.53) (0.87) (2.42)** (1.26) (1.93)* (1.03) (2.40)** (1.34)
Executive Age .022 -.002 .025 -.005 .022 -.001 .023 -.003 .021 -.001
(3.37)***(0.24) (3.95)*** (0.56) (3.38)*** (0.11) (3.61)*** (0.38) (3.27)***(0.15)
Exec Share Value .078 .071 .083 .076 .079
(5.75)*** (5.23)*** (6.22)*** (5.50)***       (5.83)***
SEC accounting .265 .202 .410 .265 .267
(1.21) (0.95) (1.88)* (1.26) (1.22)   Page 58
Table VIII 
Determinants of Income:  Alternative Regressions
    All regressions include industry dummies.  The data cover non-bank firms listed on Section 1 of the TSE.  We omit 
z- and t- statistics, and bold-face significant effects and attach one, two and three stars for significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% 
levels.  For sources, see Table II. 
Panel A:  Alternative Regression Techniques
                    (a)     (b)         (c)              (d)
Dep. Variable:      Ln Tax Liab          Ln Tax Liab          High Inc TP         No. Appearances.
                       Co Men            Cap ExEt           Co Men            Cap Ex Et         Co Men            Cap Ex Et         Co Men            Cap Ex Et    
Constant 5.561*** 1.376** .082 .720*** -.438
Log (Assets) .217*** -.027 .097*** .060 .101*** -.045 -.021 .220***
Profitability .034*** .010 .032*** .008 .012*** -.000 .008 -.005
Stock Pr Gr -.109 .234** -.090 .214** -.032 .043 -.105* .159**
Multi Positions .395*** -.268 -.020 -.156 .259*** -.041 .321*** -.500***
Option Program .187** -.153 .010 .073 .096** -.116* -.201*** .149**
Executive Age .022*** -.002 .005 .000 .013*** -.003 .037*** -.005
Exec Sh Value .078*** .065*** .033 -.009
SEC Accounting             .265                            .133                            .144                            -.200*                    .    
Technique used:            Tobit                           OLS (R    2    =.43)                 Probit                          Poisson           .    
     Notes:
     Regressions (b) and (d) are limited to those executives who paid at least 10 million yen in taxes in 2004.   
     Regression (c) gives the marginal effect of the variables rather than the coefficients.
     The "Capitalist Extra Effects" gives the coefficient on the interaction variable X*(Capitalist dummy) -- that is, the additional effect of the 
executive being a Capitalist.  
     "Capitalists" are corporate presidents who are among the top 10 shareholders of the firm, or who work at their own family firm (as defined in 
the Appendix).  "Company Men" are all other corporate executives.  
Panel B:  Alternative Capitalist Definitions
Capitalist:    Alternative 1    Alternative 2     Alternative 3    Alternative 4  .
                       Co Men            Cap ExEt           Co Men            Cap Ex Et         Co Men            Cap Ex Et         Co Men            Cap Ex Et    
Constant 5.778*** 1.765*** 5.561*** 1.355** 8.569*** -1.457 5.899*** 1.211*
Log (Assets) .215*** -.076* .218*** -.026 .083* -.038 .211*** .030
Profitability .034*** .000 .034*** .010 .039** .003 .035*** -.004
Stock Pr Gr -.130 .247** -.108 .229** -.032 .083 -.069 .166
Multi Positions .286** -.297* .394*** -.267 -.053 .506** .366*** -.298
Option Program .254*** -.201* .187** -.150 .048 .166 .186** -.165
Executive Age .017** -.000 .022*** -.002 .006 .011 .018*** -.002
Exec Sh Value .083*** .078*** .131*** .066***
SEC Accounting             .201                            .263                            .467*                           .329                     .    
Dependent variable:  Ln Tax Liability
Technique used:  Tobit
     Definitions:
     Alternative 1:  corporate presidents who either (i) are among the top 10 shareholders of the firm, (ii) work at their own family firm (as defined 
in the Appendix), (iii) have appeared on the TSR high-income taxpayer list more than five times, or (iv) are under age 40.  
     Alternative 2:  corporate presidents who meet requirements (i), (ii), or (iv) above.
     Alternative 3:  corporate presidents who meet requirements (i) or (iii) above.  
     Alternative 4:  corporate presidents who are among the top 10 shareholders of the firm.  